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Abstract
In this paper, we employ generational accounting to analyse the inter-temporal stance of
Austrian public ﬁnance in 1998 as well as the inter-temporal ﬁscal impact of immigration
to Austria. Immigrants aﬀect inter-temporal ﬁscal balance in essentially two ways. Firstly,
they have a demographic eﬀect in enlarging the population (and thus the tax base) and in
altering its age- (and gender-) composition. Secondly, they change the ﬁscal characteristics
of age cohorts due to a representative immigrant exhibiting higher or lower tax and transfer
payments than a representative native of the same age and gender. The overall ﬁscal eﬀect of
immigration is found positive, under the assumption that the age and ﬁscal characteristics of
future immigrants resemble those of the current immigrant population in Austria. This is due
to a favourable age composition and lower per capita net transfer receipts during retirement
age, which compensates for lower per capita net tax payments during working age. However,
immigration is not likely to achieve inter-temporal ﬁscal balance, even if immigration increases
or migrants are screened by skill or age.
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In the discussion on the ﬁscal costs and beneﬁts of immigration for the host country, the bur-
den that immigrants allegedly pose on social welfare systems has featured most prominently.
Lately, however, immigration has been proposed as a means to alleviate the ﬁscal burdens
associated with aging populations. It has been recognised years ago that demographic trends
in most developed countries will not allow sustaining their current pension and health systems
and will pose serious burdens on their public ﬁnances. Attempts to estimate ﬁscal contribu-
tions of immigrants usually take a cross-sectional perspective.1 For a meaningful evaluation of
immigrants’ ﬁscal impact, however, an inter-temporal analysis is necessary. Such a framework
allows to incorporate changes in ﬁscal payments and beneﬁts over time due to the aging of
populations. In the following, we will apply the method of generational accounting in order
to evaluate the ﬁscal impact of immigrants in Austria. The method has been developed by
Auerbach et al. (1991, 1994) in order to provide an indicator for the amount of intergenera-
tional redistribution implied by a given ﬁscal policy. At the same time, it enables to measure
the ’true’ level of public debt as opposed to conventional records of the budget deﬁcit and
public debt, which are only of limited signiﬁcance in the light of future public spending and
tax revenues that are set by current ﬁscal policy. In generational accounting, not only the tax
receipts and public expenditures of a given ﬁscal year are considered, but also expected future
public revenues and expenditures related to currently living as well as future generations. Fis-
cal sustainability prevails, if the so-called inter-temporal budget constraint is satisﬁed - that
is, if current public debt does not exceed the present value of future revenues minus spend-
ing. The degree of intergenerational redistribution is measured by the generational accounts
of the current newborn and the next, future generation, that is, the present value of their
taxes paid less their beneﬁts received over their lifetime. For previous applications of genera-
tional accounting on the estimation of immigrants’ ﬁscal impacts see Auerbach and Oreopoulos
(2000) and Smith and Edmonston (1997) for the U.S. and Bonin et al. (2000) for Germany.
Storesletten (2000) has used a calibrated general equilibrium overlapping generations model
to estimate the long-term ﬁscal impact of immigrants in Sweden. Findings generally are that
the ﬁscal impact of immigration on the host country is positive, depending on the age and
skill composition of immigrants.
The paper is organised as follows: the next section gives an overview of the method of gener-
ational accounting. Section 3 gives an overview of the macroeconomic and ﬁscal background
in Austria in the year 1998. Section 4 describes the demographic and ﬁscal micro-data under-
lying the derivation of generational accounts. Section 5 presents the results and the ensuing
inter-temporal state of Austrian public ﬁnances in the base year. In Section 6, we focus on the
ﬁscal contribution of immigrants and calculate the eﬀects of various immigration policies on
total public debt. Section 7 provides a review of related literature, and Section 8 concludes.
1See for example Simon (1984) for the U.S., Akbari (1989) for Canada, Ulrich (1992) for Germany and
Gustaﬀson and Osterberg (2001) for Sweden. A survey on the literature is given in Poschner (1996).
22 The methodology of generational accounting
The method of generational accounting was developed by Auerbach et al. (1991, 1992, 1994)
as a response to the shortcomings of conventional periodical budget accounting that does not
consider the long-term revenue and expenditure implications of present ﬁscal policy. While
yearly budget accounts cannot provide an indicator of intergenerational redistribution due to
ﬁscal policy, generational accounts can. In the following, we will give a brief description of the
method employed, as it can be found in more detail for example in Bonin (2001), Kotlikoﬀ
(1993, 2001) and Raﬀelh¨ uschen (1999b).
2.1 The government’s inter-temporal budget constraint
At the core of generational accounting is the inter-temporal budget constraint of the govern-
ment (e.g. the entire public sector), which requires that the present value of prospective net
tax payments to the public sector, imposed on either living or future born agents, must be
suﬃcient to ﬁnance the present value of aggregate net debt. It is expressed in terms of the









On the left-hand side of (1), Bt denotes the base year stock of government’s explicit net
debt (ﬁnancial liabilities minus the sum of ﬁnancial assets). It represents the sum of real
government deﬁcits (or surpluses) in the past, mirroring the spending and revenue history of
the public sector. On the right-hand side, Nt,k represents the present value as of year t of net
tax payments (taxes paid minus transfers received) made by all members of a generation born
in year k over the remaining life cycle: for generations currently alive, Nt,k denotes remaining
lifetime net taxes, for generations not yet born, Nt,k refers to lifetime net taxes, discounted to
the current year t. d deﬁnes the maximum age.
In testing for generational balance, generational accounting empirically evaluates whether
current ﬁscal policy is consistent with the inter-temporal budget constraint of the public
sector. If it is not, the adjustment of ﬁscal parameters in the budget constraint becomes
necessary, either now or in the future. In the case that adjustment is carried out via future
net taxes only, generational accounts would increase for future generations, implying ﬁscal
redistribution between generations.
2.2 Generational accounts
In short, the generational account of a certain gender and age (and nativity) cohort is just the
sum of discounted net tax payments that an individual of this speciﬁc gender and age (and
3nativity) cohort faces over its remaining life-span. The method of generational accounting
is strictly forward-looking in the way that for each age cohort alive it only computes the
aggregate net tax burden of a representative cohort member from a present base period on
over its remaining life-time. The aggregate remaining lifetime net tax payments of a cohort




Ts,kPs,k(1 + r)−(s−t) with κ = max(t,k). (2)
For currently living cohorts born in year k with t−d ≤ k ≤ t,κ = t; for future cohorts born in
year k > t,κ = k. Ts,k stands for the projected average net tax payments to the government in
year s paid by a representative member of the generation born in year k. Ps,k is the population
of cohort k alive at time s. r represents the supposedly constant pre-tax interest rate applied
to discount future payments back to the base period. The computation of the generational
accounts therefore requires a demographic projection, taking account of fertility, mortality
and migration trends, as well as a projection of the age-speciﬁc net tax payments by cohort,
Ts,k. In combining projected age proﬁles with the projected population structure, one derives
the rest-of-life net tax burden of living generations.
For living generations born in year k, the generational accounts in the base year t are just
the aggregate remaining lifetime net tax payments divided by the number of cohort members













s,k indicates the average tax or transfer of type i paid or received by a representative
k-born individual in period s ≥ t, hence of age s − k. By convention, ti > 0 deﬁnes a tax
payment from the private to the public sector, and ti < 0 deﬁnes a transfer payment from the
public to the private sector.
For future generations, age-speciﬁc taxes and transfers are computed by simply projecting
ﬁscal proﬁles of the base period using a constant productivity growth rate.2 Fiscal proﬁles
become
ti
t+j,k = (1 + g)jti
t,k−j. (5)
Equation (5) assigns to each agent of age t+j −k in year t+j the tax and transfer payment
observed for agents of the same age in year t, adjusted for gains in productivity.
2It is therefore assumed that base year ﬁscal policy is maintained. See Bonin (2001, pp.25) on further details
regarding the assumption of constant economic growth.
4The base year cross-section of age-speciﬁc tax and transfer payments per capita is generally
determined in two steps. First, the tax and transfer payments τi
t,k of a representative member
of each age cohort are estimated from micro-data. In a second step, to overcome data deﬁ-
ciencies on the micro level, the individual age-speciﬁc taxes and transfers, summed up over all
cohorts and weighted by the respective cohort number, are re-evaluated proportionally to ﬁt
the observed macroeconomic tax or transfer aggregate Ti
t by the application of a proportional,







From there, we derive adjusted per capita tax and transfer payments ti




2.3 Determining future generational accounts and assessing ﬁscal imbal-
ance
Within the method of generational accounting, there are diﬀerent ways to construct the gen-
erational accounts for future generations and to assess the intergenerational stance of ﬁscal
policy. First, one can proceed using (5) above, assuming that future generational accounts
are equal to the one of the generation born in the base year, corrected only by the economic
growth factor, as shown in (8) for the generation born one year after the base year:
GAt+1,t+1 = GAt,t(1 + g). (8)
Then, from the inter-temporal budget constraint, one computes the inter-temporal public
liabilities IPLt of the base year as the diﬀerence between current debt and the aggregate net
tax payments of living and future generations:




Inter-temporal public liabilities entail a revision of initial ﬁscal policy at some point in time
- if they are positive (negative), a rise (decline) in net taxes is necessary eventually. Only if
inter-temporal public liabilities are zero, ﬁscal policy is sustainable, since it does not violate
the inter-temporal budget constraint of the government. The required policy adjustment can
be undertaken in various ways. The conventional approach is to assign the uncovered liabilities
in their entirety to future generations. Aggregate future net taxes then equal the diﬀerence
between given current debt and the aggregate net tax payments of living generations, in order
to ensure that the budget constraint holds. The generational accounts for all future generations
are derived under the proposition that the government distributes the aggregate ﬁnancing need
5evenly across future generations, assuming that generational accounts stay identical except for
income growth. Depending on the choice of the speciﬁc future ﬁscal policy that is to correct
the ﬁscal imbalance, the adjustment can be undertaken via a change in any of the given tax
or transfer parameters ti
s,k. For example, the factor determining the proportional rate of
adjustment that is to be applied to all net tax payments of future born generations in order




k=t+1 Pk,kNk,k(1 + r)t−k, (10)
with Nk,k representing the present value lifetime net tax payments of a representative indi-
vidual born in period k > t. This way, we can derive the new generational accounts of future
born generations that guarantee ﬁscal sustainability under current tax and transfer policies.
Accordingly, we can choose Nk,k to contain the present value of lifetime taxes or transfers
only, or speciﬁc categories of each, to determine the necessary rate of adjustment of the cho-
sen tax or transfer categories. Alternatively, the uniform adjustment factor can be applied to
the present value life cycle taxes and/or transfers of both living and future generations - in
this case, it would be assumed that government immediately switches to a sustainable path
of ﬁscal policy, adjusting base year tax and/or transfer levels once and for all. Now, the de-
gree of inter-temporal ﬁscal imbalance can be measured by the resulting diﬀerence in lifetime
net tax payments between base year and future-born individuals. Selecting the cohort born
immediately after the base year as representative for future generations, a second indicator
for inter-temporal ﬁscal imbalance is the relative change in generational accounts between the





Alternatively, one could measure the absolute change in the lifetime net tax payments of
agents born in period t and t + 1 that satisﬁes the inter-temporal budget constraint of the
government. Fiscal policy is sustainable only if the thus derived future generational accounts
are equal to the (growth-adjusted) generational account of the current new-born, that is, if π
is equal to 1.
2.4 Generational accounting and immigration
Taking separate account of natives and immigrants as two subpopulations requires certain
changes to the equations introduced above. The inter-temporal budget constraint in (1) is




(Nt,t−s + Ft,t−s) +
∞ X
s=1
(Nt,t+s + Ft,t+s). (12)
6Foreign aggregate cohort net tax payments Ft,k are derived in analogy to those of natives






s,k(1 + r)−(s−t) with κ = max(t,k). (13)
The evolution of the foreign population P∗
s,k over time will reﬂect not only fertility and mor-
tality of immigrants, but also additional immigration as well as out-migration of previous
immigrants (net migration). Per capita net tax payments of foreigners T∗
s,k will typically diﬀer
from those of natives due to diﬀerent economic characteristics of immigrants. Analogously to
(4), aggregate foreign net tax payments are the sum of individual age-speciﬁc cohort proﬁles
τi∗
t,k, respectively. These are re-evaluated again according to macroeconomic data by using the


























The generational accounts obtained will give an unambiguous indication of the ﬁscal burdens
and contributions of immigrants and natives of all age-groups - given current ﬁscal policy,
current macroeconomic conditions, and current demographic characteristics of natives and
immigrants.3 Therefore, even if absolute numbers are to be interpreted with caution, the gen-
erational accounting exercise holds valuable information concerning the relative ﬁscal stance
of immigrants and natives as well as of current and future generations. More importantly still,
generational accounts can be obtained for any speciﬁed scenario deviating from the status quo
- and will yield important information concerning its consequences for inter-temporal ﬁscal
balance and ﬁscal incidence among generations and subpopulations. Generational accounting
can thus be used as a method for determining the net ﬁscal impact not only of immigration
as it is, but also changes in immigration policy like changes in immigration quota or the
immigration mix (e.g. the educational status of the immigrant population). Inter-temporal
ﬁscal (im)balance will be aﬀected by immigration in essentially two ways: ﬁrstly, they will
have a demographic eﬀect in enlarging the population (and thus the tax base) and in altering
its age- (and possibly gender-) composition4; secondly, they will probably change the ﬁscal
characteristics of age cohorts due to a representative immigrant having higher or lower tax
and transfer payments than a representative native of the same age and gender.
3Future changes in either of these parameters, such as a change in the educational characteristics of future
immigrants, cannot be taken into account, unless they are deliberately examined in a simulation exercise, which
gives a valid result in the sense of a ’what-would-be-if’ case when compared to the basic scenario.
4The demographic characteristics of immigrants usually aﬀect ﬁscal imbalance in a positive way, due to a
favourable average working age of immigrants. For details on the demographic data see Section 4.1.
73 The macroeconomic and ﬁscal situation in Austria in the
base year 1998
Since for the computation of generational accounts, the pattern of public revenues and ex-
penditures speciﬁc to the base year is projected into the future and thus assumed to stay
constant, some knowledge about the macroeconomic and ﬁscal environment in that year is
helpful for an interpretation of the results.5 The macroeconomic situation in 1998 was, with a
real growth rate of 3.3 percent, a rather favourable one. However, this was not reﬂected much
on the labour market or on ﬁscal parameters such as tax revenues and social spending, as these
eﬀects are commonly lagging behind the development of the growth rate. The ﬁscal situation
in that year was predominately determined by previous eﬀorts to fulﬁl the Maastricht deﬁcit
criterion for participation in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In order to
bring down the budget deﬁcit from its 5.1 percent of GDP in 1995 to a level below 3 percent,
ﬁscal consolidation packages were enacted in 1996 and 1997. As mentioned in Keuschnigg
et al. (2000), they consisted to the larger part of a cut in expenditures such as salaries and
employment of civil servants and general administration, unemployment beneﬁts and early re-
tirement pensions. To a lesser part, revenues were increased via the wage and personal income
taxes, as well as corporate and interest income taxes, an energy tax and a variety of indirect
taxes. In 1997, the deﬁcit rate decreased to 1.9 percent, with another increase in 1998 to 2.4
percent. Public debt decreased from around 70 percent of GDP in 1995 to 64.9 percent in
1998.6 In order to get a clearer picture of the composition of these aggregate budget ﬁgures,
we will now have a closer look at the public expenditures and revenues in 1998.
Public expenditures decreased from 57.2 percent of GDP in 1995 to 53.9 percent in 1997 and
increased to 54.2 percent in 1998.7 While the share of transfers in GDP in 1998 decreased
relative to the previous year, expenditures from the statutory pension insurance, the most
substantial transfer category of all, increased by about 4.2 percent relative to 1997.8 In the
long run, it is indeed the expected stark increase in pension outlays, due to increasing life
expectancy and decreasing fertility under the current pay-as-you-go pension scheme, which
puts perhaps the most important strain on the public budget. While the pension reform of
November 1997 reduced the generosity of early retirement pensions and tightened eligibility
criteria, the measures were judged not to reach far enough.9 Similarly, spending pressures
are present in the health care system. They were addressed by cost-reducing measures in
the 1996 and 1997 budgets, including measures to increase the revenues of the health funds
and to bring hospital ﬁnancing together under one institution for each federal state, to help
rationalise decisions. There is evidence that the diagnostics-based reimbursement scheme that






8provision of health services to some extent. However, a large potential for cost-cutting in the
health sector remained.10 Finally, expenditure on interest payments increased by 5.2 percent
in 1998, which was solely due to the increase in public debt, since the average interest rate on
public debt decreased relative to 1997.11
As to the public revenues, the share of taxes in GDP increased signiﬁcantly from 24.8 percent
of GDP in 1997 to 25.6 percent in 1998. In particular, revenue from the corporate, income
and labour tax increased, mainly due to the legislative measures taken in the 1996 tax reform
package (Strukturanpassungsgesetz 1996) including the abolition of preferential tax treatments
as well as an increase in tax pre-payments.12
Table 1 below shows the data for the consolidated budget in Austria in the base year 1998, as
they were used for the benchmarking of aggregated micro-data. The macroeconomic data on
revenues were taken from national accounts data in Statistik Austria (2001a) and data from
the Association of Austrian Social Insurance Institutions (Hauptverband der ¨ osterreichischen
Sozialversicherungstr¨ ager) (1999). Aggregate data on expenditures were taken from the report
on social expenditure by the Federal Ministry of Social Security and Generations (Bundesmin-
isterium f¨ ur soziale Sicherheit und Generationen) (1999). As these aggregate data on public
revenues and expenditures need to correspond to the respective microeconomic survey data,
single budget items were regrouped and summed up as described in the next section below. In-
tergovernmental grants and transfers were cancelled out.13 Thus, we derive aggregate revenues
and expenditures of 1036.199 billion (bn.) ATS each. It can be seen that most of the revenue
in that year was generated by social security contributions, followed by the value added tax
and the labour income tax. On the expenditure side, government consumption and pensions
were the biggest items, followed by education, interest payments and health expenditures.
4 Empirical derivation of generational accounts
The method of generational accounting was developed by Auerbach et al. (1991, 1992, 1994)
as a response to the shortcomings of conventional periodical budget accounting that does not
consider the long-term revenue and expenditure implications of present ﬁscal policy. While
yearly budget accounts cannot provide an indicator of intergenerational redistribution due to
ﬁscal policy, generational accounts can. Detailed descriptions of the method can be found for
example in Bonin (2001), Kotlikoﬀ (1993, 2001) and Raﬀelh¨ uschen (1999b). The construction
of generational accounts for living and future generations requires data on current and future
populations as well as net tax payments by cohorts. In the following, we will describe the data
sources and assumptions used for 1) the population projections and 2) the disaggregating of
the Austrian budget in 1998 into tax and transfer proﬁles according to age, sex and nativity.
10OECD (1999, p.48).
11Lehner (1999).
12Lehner (1999, p.370), OECD (1999, p.40).
13Compare Keuschnigg et al. (2000).
9Table 1: Consolidated budget in Austria (1998).
RECEIPTS EXPENDITURES
Personal income tax 44.124 Pensions 258.142
Labour income tax 201.979 Old age care 21.297
Social security contributions 397.498 Health 95.691
Capital income taxes 20.014 Unemployment 23.467
Value added tax 215.838 Family-related beneﬁts 53.126
Other indirect taxes 92.446 Social assistance 3.721




Total 1.036.199 Total 1.036.199
Note: In bn. ATS.
Source: BMSG (1999), Hauptverband der ¨ osterreichischen Sozialversicherungstr¨ ager (1999), OENB
(2000), Statistik Austria (2001a).
Along with the majority of other generational accounting studies14, we group generations into
5-year age cohorts.15 We have four subpopulations: native men, native women, foreign men
and foreign women. The reason for choosing 1998 as the base year instead of a more recent
year lies in the availability of the required data. More exactly, most of the micro-data on taxes
and transfers by nativity are only available from the European Community Household Panel
(ECHP), the most recent wave of which (1999)16 is referring to labour and income tax data
of the year 1998, as will be discussed in detail below.
4.1 Demographic scenarios
For the population data of living and future generations by age, sex and nativity, we refer to
Statistik Austria population projections based on the latest population census from 2001.17
While the projections of the population data are modelled explicitly by age and sex, they
14See for example Bonin (2001) and European Commission (1999).
15This aggregation does not represent too much of a distortion as long as there are no large single age groups
within those cohorts that exhibit a distinctly diﬀerent pattern of tax payments and transfer beneﬁts. For
example, an increase in the number of oldest old would make the exact distribution of net taxes among this
population group more important (see Bonin (2001, p.108).
16At the time that the study was undertaken.
17Data were obtained from Gustav Lebhart, Statistik Austria.
10do not account separately for natives and foreigners. Thus, in order to derive the required
population projections for natives as well as foreigners, we resort to the assumption that the
proportion of foreigners in Austria is constant and equal to their average population share
during the three latest years available: 2000, 2001 and 2002.
The population projections used rely on the following assumptions regarding mortality, fertility
and migration. The fertility rate is assumed to stay at a new long-term level of 1.4 from 2002
onwards. Life expectancy at birth is assumed to increase by 7.2 years for men and 6.3 years
for women in 2002 to 83.0 and 88.0 in 2050, respectively, and to remain constant thereafter.
60-year-old men are expected to reach an average age of more than 85 after 2050, 60-year-old
women an average age of more than 89. The decreasing number of births and the increasing
number of deaths would lead to a decrease in the population from around 2050 by 0.5 percent
per year without migration. Due to immigration, Austria’s population is expected to increase
from 8.05 million in 2002 to 8.43 million in 2027. Net immigration data have been corrected
upwards since the last oﬃcial forecast and are assumed to increase from 17300 in 2001 to
around 29000 in 2006 due to the expansion of the European Union in 2004, but to decrease
from then onwards to 22500 in 2050. From 2028 onwards, net immigration is expected to stay
below the birth deﬁcit and thus lead to a decrease in the total population that is to reach
about 20000 people per year by 2050. In our sensitivity analysis in Section 5.3, we test for the
eﬀects of higher as well as lower net immigration and fertility on generational accounts and
ﬁscal imbalance.
4.2 Fiscal scenarios
Next, we need to specify the age-, sex- and nativity-speciﬁc personal tax and transfer pay-
ments, the so-called cohort proﬁles. For this, we ﬁrst determine the base year per capita tax
and transfer payments of the various age cohorts in each of our subpopulations, distinguished
by nativity and sex: native men, native women, foreign men and foreign women. The personal
and household micro data used to construct the cohort proﬁles and the generational accounts
presented in this study were mainly taken from survey data in the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP), years 1998 and 1999. The ECHP provides a large sample consist-
ing of about 60000 households with about 130000 individuals in Europe, which are surveyed
through 15 years. In Austria, about 3000 households are participating, with about 7000 in-
dividuals. The data are available on the household as well as the individual level. Following
Bonin (2001), we assign most individual tax and transfer data directly, in the year when the
tax or transfer payment is reported to have occurred. Even though this incidence assump-
tion may not always accurately reﬂect the actual ﬁscal beneﬁts and burdens of an individual,
we stick to it as a feasible second-best solution.18 Fiscal data that are only available at the
household level in the ECHP (that is, in our case, housing and social assistance beneﬁts),
are allocated to individuals by assuming that the total amount reported is distributed evenly
among all household members. This assignment is also likely to be misrepresentative of the
18See Bonin (2001, pp.107) for possible ﬂaws and a justiﬁcation of this incidence approach.
11actual incidence of tax and transfer payments within the household - however, as before, it
seems reasonable for payments depending on the socio-economic composition of households,
which stay representative as long as household composition does not change. The ECHP sur-
vey data are complemented by micro data provided by the Austrian Statistical Oﬃce as well as
the Upper Austrian Health Insurance Administration (Gebietskrankenkasse Ober¨ osterreich).
In a second step, the age proﬁles are benchmarked against the respective overall public budget
data as presented in Table 1 by application of the adjustment factor. Those data were then
smoothed by building moving averages among cohort values. In doing so, we hope to amelio-
rate variances in the data that are due to small sample sizes and retain representative cohort
proﬁles. In addition, we are enlarging the sample size by drawing on both the survey results
of 1998 and 1999. We now turn to explain the data sources and speciﬁc assumptions employed
for arriving at the individual cohort proﬁles for each of our tax and transfer categories.
4.2.1 Tax and contribution payments
Labour income tax data and social insurance contributions data are not available by nativity
from national statistical sources. The Lohnsteuerstatistik published by Statistik Austria19
does not account separately for native Austrians and immigrants. For the same reason, it was
not possible to resort to data from the Association of Austrian Social Insurance Institutions
for age-gender-nativity proﬁles of social security contributions. The ECHP’s detailed data on
gross and net labour income by age, gender and nativity were therefore used to estimate indi-
vidual average wage taxes plus social security contributions.20 Thus, payroll contributions to
the state-organized, pay-as-you-go ﬁnanced social insurance are regarded as an integral part
of gross wages and are assigned fully to workers. Due to data limitations it was not possible
to construct separate proﬁles for wage taxes on the one hand, and the diﬀerent contributions
to social security (that is, contributions to the public pension scheme, statutory health and
accident insurance and unemployment insurance) on the other hand. Tax payments and so-
cial security contributions from the usual two-months extra pay that is not included in the
gross and net income data were derived from given yearly gross income data by subjecting
taxable additional income to the tax tariﬀ applicable. Filed personal income taxes (veranlagte
Einkommensteuer) were obtained directly from the ECHP, together with any reimbursements
or additional payments in the following year, which were deducted or added to the income tax
data to obtain the ﬁnal values. From the social security contributions of the self-employed,
only contributions to the public pension scheme are available directly. Contributions to the
statutory health and accident insurance of the self-employed, not surveyed by the ECHP, are
allocated along their contributions to pensions, since health insurance contributions are a ﬁxed
percentage of gross earnings as well, subject to the same contribution threshold. Contributions
19That was used for the ﬁrst generational evaluation of Austrian public ﬁnances by Keuschnigg et al. (1998).
20The fact that variables of the ECHP are not imputed, poses the problem of a bias due to missing values in
cases where an answer was refused. However, because of the small frequency of such cases (a maximum of 11
percent of total), the bias is likely to be small.
12of pensioners to the statutory health scheme, which are strictly proportional to pension in-
come, are assigned with the relative distribution of pension beneﬁts by age, sex and nativity.21
Tax payments on pension income were calculated from given net pension income, by taking
account of the income tax tariﬀ and applicable deductions. The tax burden on private capital
income, which is strictly proportional, is allocated according to the capital income proﬁles
generated from the ECHP data on net of tax revenue from interest and dividends. Taxes on
business like the corporate tax as well as other, minor taxes like the tax on business capital
income are assumed to be borne by business capital and are not assigned to the household
sector. This means that they are distributed uniformly among cohorts as part of the residual
in public revenues that are not age-speciﬁc and therefore not allocated directly to individu-
als.22 23 Indirect tax payments (value-added tax and other indirect taxes) are not surveyed
in the ECHP and had to be inferred from consumption expenditure data for adult equiva-
lents24 in the Statistik Austria’s consumption survey (Konsumerhebung) 1999/2000 by 5-year
age cohorts25 of household heads and 12 consumption categories26. Separate tax proﬁles were
computed for each consumption category, since the share of the diﬀerent consumption goods
in total purchases varies with age, and so do tax payments, therefore. The tax rates to be
applied were computed as the means of tax rates applicable to the diﬀerent consumption good
COICOP subcategories27 and can diﬀer from the formal value-added tax rates of 10 percent
and 20 percent on goods for basic needs and other goods, respectively, depending on the com-
position of consumption goods in the various categories. Except for one-person households,
the consumption survey does not distinguish between household heads by sex, and male and
female consumption tax payments therefore had to be assumed to be equal. Also, due to the
lack in data, consumption patterns were not available separately for natives and foreigners.
Therefore, foreign tax payments had to be distributed in proportion to the relative average
consumption expenditure level of foreigners, assuming an identical consumption pattern of
foreigners and natives. As with labour and capital income taxes and social security contribu-
tions, incidence is assumed to lie with the taxpayers, that is, in this case, the household heads.
Dependent children are assumed not to bear any tax burden themselves.28 Among other indi-
21So are pension insurance contributions by retired civil servants, due to the lack of a more appropriate
assignment mechanism.
22See Garvey and Espenshade (1996) and Clune (1997). Alternatively, one could assign those taxes to private
individuals according to their annual revenue from private capital income (compare Bonin (2001, p.109)).
However, since it is diﬃcult to determine the true incidence of such taxes, we go for the most general option.
23Similarly, no ’inﬂation tax’ or minor taxes on private capital like the private wealth tax or the property
tax are assigned to individuals according to their interest and dividend income (see Bonin (2001, pp.110)).
24Household expenditure adjusted according to the size and type of household.
25From 24 and younger to 75 and older.
26As listed in COICOP (Classiﬁcation of the Individual Consumption Expenditures by Purpose).
27Provided by Bernhard Mazegger (Statistik Austria) on request.
28Data limitations in the consumption survey regarding the composition of households by age of household
head prevents us from following a common procedure of distributing part of the indirect tax burden among
infant household members by certain consumption weights. In the approach use, children are treated as a
’consumption good whose quality, which is related to their commodity consumption, enters the parents’ utility
function, but is a substitute for parents’ own consumption of commodities’ (Razin and Sadka (1995, p.14)
13rect taxes, some of the most important ones are the taxes on stimulants (mainly alcohol and
tobacco) and beverages, excise duties on energy and mineral oil, the Normverbrauchsabgabe
(Nova) and the insurance tax, which together make up about 89 percent of total revenue from
other indirect taxes on goods and services.29 These tax payments are distributed in proportion
to the amount of average cohort expenditure subject to the respective tax.
4.2.2 Transfer receipts
Expenditure proﬁles are also to a large part constructed by making use of the ECHP’s detailed
survey of beneﬁt recipiency, which is, at the same time, the only source for determining trans-
fers within Austria’s social security system by nativity. Cohort-speciﬁc individual receipts
of pension beneﬁts, monetary health care beneﬁts, unemployment beneﬁts, family-related
beneﬁts, old-age care, social assistance and education grants are derived from the respective
average transfer receipts of individuals in the ECHP. Cohort proﬁles for pension beneﬁts in-
clude public pension income of all sorts - that is primarily old-age pensions, early retirement
pensions, survivors’ pensions and invalidity pensions. In the original cross-section, average
pension receipts of natives decline with the age of pensioners, reﬂecting past diﬀerences in
working careers. In order to avoid projecting this implausible lifetime pattern of pension pay-
ments into the future, we follow the procedure described in Bonin (2001, pp.112) and design
maturation eﬀects in the following way: for native male cohorts older than 70 and native fe-
male cohorts older than 80, we assume that average pension receipts in the initial cross-section
remain constant over the remaining life cycle (apart from productivity growth). For younger
base year cohorts and all future cohorts, we hold the received pension amount constant from
the age of 70 (80), when average per capita pension receipts are at or close to the maximum
in the base year. Proﬁles on health care beneﬁts comprise monetary beneﬁts derived from the
ECHP as well as health care related in-kind beneﬁts30, which were available by 5-year age
groups, sex and nativity from the Upper Austrian Health Insurance Administration31 32. With
family-related beneﬁts33, incidence is assumed not to lie with transfer recipients but with the
children who are the cause for the transfer to take place. Allocating family-related beneﬁts to
those household members who are classiﬁed as dependent children justiﬁes assuming that the
in: Bonin (2001, p.111)). An advantage of this perspective is that both the level as well as the relative age
distribution of consumption do not necessarily vary in line with fertility, and the assumption of constant tax
proﬁles in the light of demographic change is justiﬁed (Bonin (2001, p.111)).
29Statistische Nachrichten (2001a, pp.875).
30Comprising Arztkosten, Krankenhauskosten, Medikamentenkosten, Heilbehelfe- und Hilfsmittelkosten,
Fahrtspesen, Transportkosten.
31Provided by J¨ urgen Himmelbauer (Ober¨ osterreichische Gebietskrankenkasse, Gesundheitsberichterstattung)
on request.
32The Upper Austrian data seem to represent the national data pretty well, as is revealed in a comparison
with health care beneﬁt proﬁles using data on Austrian health care cost patterns (’acute health care costs’
containing Arzt-, Krankenhaus-, Medikamentekosten) from Riedel and Hofmarcher (2001).
33Comprising Familienbeihilfe, Wochengeld und Karenzgeld, Geburtenbeihilfe und sonstige Familienleistun-
gen.
14initial proﬁle of adults stays unchanged when fertility changes and, for example, the average
number of children per household falls.34 As in the case of family-related beneﬁts, household
(instead of individual) data are used for constructing age proﬁles for public housing support35
and social assistance (Sozialhilfe der L¨ ander und Gemeinden in Form von Geldleistungen).
Here, too, transfer recipiency does not mainly depend on individual characteristics but on
characteristics of the household. Therefore, in order to set up transfer proﬁles which are more
likely to stay representative in the course of demographic transition, housing support and so-
cial assistance beneﬁts are distributed evenly among all household members. Unemployment
insurance beneﬁts36, emergency welfare beneﬁts (Notstandshilfe)37, old-age transfers38 and
education grants39 again are derived from individual transfer receipts surveyed in the ECHP.
Finally, in-kind education expenditure40 is assigned explicitly to the receiving age cohorts,
since it also represents government expenditure that is dependent on age. Future education
expenditure is assumed to develop proportionally to the fraction of an age cohort enrolled in
the educational system. Per capita educational expenditure is again assumed to stay constant
apart from productivity growth. In using Statistik Austria41 educational expenditure data by
school type42 together with pre-school and school enrolment statistics43, age proﬁles are con-
structed for pre-schools (Krippen, Kinderg¨ arten, Horte), primary education, lower secondary
education, higher secondary and vocational education and tertiary education (comprising uni-
versities, Kunsthochschulen and Fachhochschulen). The rest of net government expenditure,
which does not display a speciﬁc age-gender-nativity pattern, is allocated lump sum to all
cohorts.
In establishing age-gender-nativity proﬁles for the tax and transfer categories listed above, (the
major part in) public revenues and expenditures are traced down with respect to individual
characteristics of taxpayers and transfer recipients. The distribution of taxes and transfers that
results from both legal regulations as well as individual economic circumstances is analysed.
Age will doubtlessly make a diﬀerence, as well as gender - as for nativity, it is often claimed
to be the case. Here, however, evidence from the exercise above will have to be examined in
detail yet.
34See Bonin (2001, p.116).
35Comprising Wohnbeihilfe, Mietzinsbeihilfe, Mietbeihilfe vom Sozialamt, sonstige Wohnungsunterst¨ utzungen,
Annuit¨ atenzusch¨ usse.
36Arbeitslosengeld, Beihilfen aus der Arbeitsmarktverwaltung und Sonderunterst¨ utzung.
37A speciﬁc welfare beneﬁt for the unemployed who do not receive unemployment beneﬁts any longer.
38Old-age transfers include payments received of any public institution and therefore take account of both
the Austrian federal old-age care (Bundespﬂegegeld aus der Pensions- und Unfallversicherung) as well as the
L¨ ander transfers.
39Unterst¨ utzung f¨ ur Schul-/Berufsausbildung und/oder Studium, sonstige ausbildungsbezogene Un-
terst¨ utzungen.
40Personalaufwand, Sachaufwand und Investitionen.
41Statistik Austria (2002).
42According to the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education 1997.
43Provided by Wolfgang Pauli (Statistik Austria, Direktion Bev¨ olkerung) and Sabine Martinschitz (Statistik
Austria, Direktion Volkswirtschaft) on request.
154.2.3 Empirical results of the cross-section 1998
In order to ensure that aggregate per capita tax and transfer payments of cohorts correspond
to their respective public sector budget values in the year surveyed, the micro data proﬁles
described above are re-evaluated by an adjustment factor in order to comply with macroeco-
nomic aggregates. The public sector budget underlying the generational accounts is displayed
in Table 1. Tax and transfer payments are included irrespective of the federal level of govern-
ment, also including the paraﬁscal social insurance institutions, in order to reﬂect the public
sector net payments of generations as comprehensively as possible. Reported government pur-
chases were derived as the net value of the public sector receipts and expenditures that were
taken account of, and reﬂect public spending that cannot be assigned reliably to speciﬁc age
groups, such as government consumption of goods and services, public subsidies and public
sector personnel spending. Figures 1, 2 and 3 below display the absolute per capita tax and
transfer payments of representative cohort members in 1998 obtained by benchmarking the
surveyed micro proﬁles against the base year budget.44














































native men native women foreign men foreign women
Figure 3 shows the cohort-speciﬁc net tax burdens in 1998, that is, their average annual tax
payments less transfer receipts. We can see that while native men are net contributors to
the public system during the age of 20 to 60, net tax payments of women are only positive
during the age of 25 to 55, and they are smaller. In their youth as well as during retirement
44Displayed values were also smoothed by calculating moving averages across age cohorts as described above.











native men native women foreign men foreign women
age, individuals are net beneﬁciaries from the public tax and transfer system. The pattern
of foreign male and female net payments is similar to that of natives, though the absolute
amount paid is smaller for a large part of the life-cycle, respectively, most distinctively so
for men. Net payments of foreign women exceed those of native women from the age of
45. Also, they turn negative later in life for both foreign men and women in comparison to
their native counterparts. As to the extent of redistribution between generations, genders
and natives and foreigners, no ﬁnal conclusions can be drawn from this cross-sectional survey.
For a valid evaluation of absolute and relative net tax burdens of cohorts, we need to take
demographic parameters, such as population size and mortality, into account. This is done
within the generational accounting framework, which uses population projections to determine
the present value of rest-of-life net tax payments of cohorts, while assuming that the base year
amounts of revenue and spending stay constant except for productivity growth. For the long-
term productivity growth rate, we use 1.5 percent in the base case scenario, in accordance
with the generational accounting studies collected by the European Commission (1999). As
discussed in Bonin (2001, pp.130), the discount rate used for calculating the present value of
future payments in generational accounting studies usually ranges above the average rate of
return on risk-free government bonds to incorporate the premium paid for risk, but below the
return on private sector capital, which tends to be more volatile than public payments streams.
We use a discount rate of 5 percent for the base case, again to render results comparable with
European Commission (1999) studies. However, we will also carry out sensitivity tests in
17order to test for the eﬀect that the assumption of a diﬀerent discount rate has on our results.
Thus, in Section 5.3.2 we compute generational accounts based on discount rates of four and
six percent, assuming that risk aversion or uncertainty of future net tax payments is lower
or higher than in the base case, respectively. The following section presents the calculated
generational accounts for natives as well as foreigners in Austria in 1998 and analyses the
according inter-temporal sustainability of Austrian public ﬁnances.
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5 Generational redistribution in Austria
5.1 Generational accounts of present generations
In Figure 4, we see the gender- and nationality-speciﬁc generational accounts for generations
living in the base year. Since generational accounts represent the present values of rest-of-life
net tax payments of generations, they are not comparable across age groups. We can, however,
still compare the intra-generational diﬀerences in net tax burdens between our ﬁscally distinct
subpopulations of native men, native women, foreign men and foreign women.
The generational accounts display the characteristic lifetime pattern of net tax payments
independent of gender and nationality. During youth, rest-of-life net payments gradually
increase because youth-speciﬁc transfers disappear and high tax payments during working age
18Figure 4: Generational accounts for living generations by gender and nationality. Base year

















































native men native women foreign men foreign women
are discounted less and thus gain in weight. Among cohorts born in the year 1998, lifetime net
taxes are negative and thus constitute net transfers. A comparison of generational accounts
of natives and foreigners in Figure 5 shows that, generally, a representative native individual
receives slightly more net transfers over the rest of his or her life than a representative foreign
individual until the age of 20, and pays more in net taxes over the rest of his or her life during
working age until the age of 35. For cohorts older than 35, the picture looks diﬀerent, and
foreigners’ rest-of-life net tax payments are higher than those of natives. This is explained by
the fact that, on the one hand, foreign men and women become net transfer recipients later
in life in comparison to native men and women, respectively, as can also be seen in Figure 3.
On the other hand, net transfers to be received during the rest of their lives are signiﬁcantly
smaller in comparison to natives.
We can track the sources of nationality- and gender-speciﬁc redistribution by disaggregating
the generational accounts into our various categories of taxes and transfers. Tables 6, 7, 8
and 9 in the Appendix provide such a decomposition of generational accounts for native men,
native women, foreign men and foreign women, respectively. In comparing Tables 6 and 7,
we ﬁnd, as expected, that diﬀerences in the generational accounts of native men and native
women primarily come from higher labour income taxes and social security contributions of
men. The present value of these payments during the life-time of base-year male newborns,
for example, is almost 2.5 times that of female newborns. Gender diﬀerentials in rest-of-life
19Figure 5: Generational accounts for living generations by nationality. Base year 1998. Growth















































representative native representative foreign
labour taxes and social security contributions are highest for cohorts at or near their retirement
age. Similarly, we ﬁnd that native men pay higher capital income taxes, and receive higher
pensions and unemployment beneﬁts during the rest of their lives than native women. There
are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences as far as VAT and excise tax payments, health and family-related
beneﬁts, housing beneﬁts, social assistance beneﬁts or education are concerned. Here, in
general, present values for female cohorts slightly exceed those for male cohorts - an exception
are social assistance payments, which are higher for men until the age of 65, but fall below
those for women for older cohorts. This is to be explained by higher social assistance payments
to women among the oldest old on the one hand, and the higher life expectancy of women
on the other. This eﬀect is even more pronounced in the case of old-age care beneﬁts, where
women are expected to receive about two to three times the amount of men during the rest of
their lives. In total, native men born in the base year are expected to receive about the same
amount as women in transfers (ATS 2967000 versus ATS 2797000), whereas their expected tax
payments are nearly two times higher (ATS 3769000 versus ATS 2078000)45. When looking at
gender-speciﬁc diﬀerences in generational accounts among foreigners (Tables 8 and 9), we get
similar results. Notable exceptions are old-age care beneﬁts, which are higher for male than
for female foreigners, and social assistance beneﬁts, from which female foreigners beneﬁt more
than male foreigners over the rest of their lifetime. When comparing rest-of-life taxes and
45Adding up single rest-of-life tax payments and transfer receipts of new-borns in Tables 6 and 7.
20transfers between natives and foreigners, we notice that in most cohorts, natives pay higher
rest-of-life taxes and also receive higher rest-of-life transfers in return. This eﬀect is especially
pronounced in the case of labour income taxes and social security contributions, as well as
pension and old-age care beneﬁts, but also health and housing beneﬁts and, among men,
social assistance beneﬁts. One noteworthy exception is unemployment beneﬁts, where rest-of-
life payments are higher for foreign men than native men up to the age of 35. For newborns
in the base year, the value of expected tax payments for native men throughout their life is
two times that for foreign men (ATS 3769000 versus ATS 1844000), whereas expected transfer
beneﬁts exceed those of foreign men to a slightly lesser extent (ATS 2967000 versus ATS
1573000). For female newborns, the respective values are similar, with ATS 2073000 versus
ATS 1128000 of expected life-time tax payments, and ATS 2797000 versus ATS 1441000 of
expected transfer beneﬁts for native and foreign women, respectively.
Finally, one should remember that there are certain limitations for using absolute generational
accounts for an interpretation of redistribution between natives and foreigners as well as gen-
ders.46 As mentioned above, results are valid only given the underlying incidence assumptions.
Thus, for example, generational accounts do not consider intra-household distribution. On the
other hand, generational accounts do not say anything about redistribution relative to pre-tax
resources. As shown in Bonin (2001), diﬀerences in ﬁscal burdens can appear considerably
smaller when taking into account the life cycle income positions of subpopulations.
5.2 Inter-temporal ﬁscal imbalance
In order to determine the long-term ﬁscal sustainability of Austrian public ﬁnances in 1998, we
compute the size of inter-temporal public liabilities, or the so-called ’true public debt’, which
is the diﬀerence between the nominal value of public debt at the beginning of the base year
and aggregate present value net tax payments for living as well as future generations, extended
out to inﬁnity. Therefore, we subtract from the oﬃcially recorded ﬁnancial liabilities equal to
61.4 percent of the base year GDP the sum of the generational accounts of all subpopulations,
multiplied by the respective projected cohort sizes, which is equal to -106.1 percent of GDP.
As a result, we obtain inter-temporal public liabilities amounting to 167.5 percent of GDP
(see Table 2). This indicator is more accurate than common measures of ﬁscal soundness in
that it comprises not only the oﬃcial debt, but also future public liabilities and assets that
are implied by present ﬁscal policy. The state of ﬁscal policy in Austria in 1998 was therefore
unsustainable, since aggregate present and future expected net tax payments did not only not
serve to cover existing debt, but were negative and thus expanded the gap in public ﬁnances
even more.
For a base year newborn native, age-speciﬁc rest-of-life net tax payments are positive, while
they are negative for a base year newborn foreigner. Both, however, are exceeded by far by
46See Bonin (2001, p.137).
21Table 2: The state of inter-temporal ﬁscal balance in Austria (1998).
IPL (% of GDP) 167.5
Oﬃcial public debt (% of GDP) 61.4
Implicit government debt (% of GDP) 106.1
Percentage change required
for future cohorts only:




all taxes and transfers 8.2
taxes only 14.4
transfers only 18.9
per capita rest-of-life net government purchases, which render generational accounts negative
for natives as well as foreigners. When individuals get older, generational accounts rise due to
rising present value net tax payments and declining rest-of-life government consumption. Per
capita rest-of-life government consumption of foreigners is generally lower than that of natives
due to a sharper decline in the foreign population towards old age. In addition, age-speciﬁc net
payments of foreigners exceed those of natives at age 11-15 and from the age of 41 onwards.
As a consequence, foreign generational accounts exceed those of natives from the age of 36
onwards. Since the present value of expected tax payments does not cover the present values
of expected transfer payments and consumption spending, and, furthermore, the outstanding
government debt of the base year needs to be redeemed, a policy adjustment is necessary.
This adjustment will entail either a rise in tax levels and/or a reduction in government spending
levels, either for future generations only, or for both current and future generations, as de-
scribed in Section 2.3. Comparing the value of total public debt with that found in Keuschnigg
et al. (1999), we ﬁnd that ﬁscal sustainability has improved during 1995-1998, though a large
gap of 167.5 percent of GDP still existed in 1998. Apart from a more favourable projected
population structure47, this might have to do with the ﬁscal consolidation packages enacted by
the Austrian government in 1996 and 199748, as well as improved macro-economic conditions
(annual real economic growth accelerated from 1.6 percent in 1995 to 3.9 percent in 199849).
47Although in the present study, both fertility as well as mortality is assumed to be lower than in the study
by Keuschnigg et al. (1999) and thus rather detrimental to inter-temporal ﬁscal balance, net immigration is
assumed to be higher (compare Section 4.1).
48The measures resulted in a decrease in pension and health outlays, most notably (compare Table 1 and
Table I in Keuschnigg et al. (2000)).
49Statistik Austria (2003b).
22Of course, we have to take into account the fact that diﬀerent microeconomic data sets50 were
used. In addition, unlike in Keuschnigg et al. (1999), we derive generational accounts for
foreigners explicitly. Since foreign tax and transfer payments are lower on average than those
of natives, ﬁscal indicators can be expected to deviate. A comparison of generational accounts
derived for the two base years (see Figure 6 below) reveals an increase in the generational ac-
counts of most age cohorts over time, most signiﬁcantly for males of working age, but also for
those of retirement age. Since, despite of the pick-up in real growth rates, unemployment even
increased slightly during the period51, labour income taxes are not likely to have increased due
to an increase in the tax base. Instead, tax rates were raised as part of the consolidation pack-
age, together with reductions on tax allowances and deductions. Besides, eligibility criteria
for unemployment beneﬁts were tightened, and public pension transfers were cut, especially
by limiting early retirement.52 A comparison of generational accounts disaggregated into the
single tax and transfer categories conﬁrms that the largest increase occurred in per capita
labour income taxes and social security contributions, while per capita pension, health and
unemployment beneﬁts decreased.
Figure 6: Generational accounts for living generations for the base years 1995 and 1998.





























male (95) female (95) native male (98) native female (98)
50Labour income taxes and social security contributions in the present study were derived from the ECHP
instead of national statistical sources, education and health care beneﬁts were derived from diﬀerent sources,
as well (see Section 4.2).
51From 3.9 percent in 1995 to 4.5 percent in 1998, according to Eurostat deﬁnition (Statistik Austria (2003c)).
52See Section 3.
23Note: 1998 current values. Values for the base year 1995 are from Keuschnigg et al. (1999) and are
corrected for real productivity growth.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
Results presented in the previous sections were derived under certain assumptions regarding
the projected population, the interest rate and the growth rate. In order to test for the
robustness of the ﬁndings against variations in these underlying parameters, we carry out
sensitivity tests for each, varying only one parameter at a time, while maintaining the status
quo setting for all other variables.
5.3.1 Demographic parameters
In order to test for the sensitivity of ﬁscal imbalance indicators with regard to the underlying
demographic parameters, we conduct the generational accounting analysis for a high as well
as a low fertility scenario, and for a high as well as a low migration scenario. Under the high
fertility scenario, the fertility rate is assumed to reach 1.7 from 2015 onwards (versus a constant
1.4 in the base case). The low fertility scenario is based on a fertility rate of 1.1, which is to
come into eﬀect from 2015 onwards, as well. As to the diﬀerent migration scenarios, annual net
immigration is assumed to increase (decrease) by 10000 relative to base case scenario. Annual
net immigration is therefore assumed to ﬂuctuate between 40000 (2006) and 30000 (2041)
under the high migration scenario, and between 20000 (2006) and 10000 (2041) under the low
migration scenario. Results of the various policy experiments are summed up in Table 3. It
can be seen that higher (lower) fertility increases (decreases) inter-temporal ﬁscal imbalance.
Since under base-year ﬁscal policy, newborns exhibit negative net tax payments over their
lifetime, each additional newborn adds to the burden on the inter-temporal public budget.
Likewise, the burden on future generations necessary to close the ﬁnancing gap increases with
fertility. While, for a given amount of total public debt, an increase in the cohort size of
future generations would lead to a decrease in the per capita burden of future agents (the
ﬁnancing gap can now be distributed among a greater number of agents), the increase in
total public debt outweighs this eﬀect here.53 If the ﬁnancing gap is distributed both among
current and future generations, we see that the respective additional ﬁnancing need, measured
by the lump-sum tax54, increases as well, in comparison with the base case. Higher (lower)
net immigration than in the base case results in slightly lower (higher) inter-temporal public
liabilities. Since immigrants typically are of working age at the time of their entry into the
country, they enlarge the group of net tax payers and thus reduce the inter-temporal ﬁscal
53In Bonin (2001), pp.153, increased fertility leads to a decrease in the burden on future agents necessary to
close the sustainability gap.
54The lump-sum tax represents the annual additional average tax payment that each currently living and
future individual has got to pay in order to balance the inter-temporal budget constraint. It is derived as
the diﬀerence between the generational account of base year new-borns and their ﬁctive generational account
resulting from an application of the necessary percentage increase in net tax payments (not shown).
24burden. Compared to the speciﬁed changes in fertility, however, the eﬀect of the speciﬁed
changes in net immigration on inter-temporal ﬁscal balance is low. While, in our case, low
(high) fertility leads to a decrease (increase) in total public debt by 17.1 (28.3) percentage
points, high (low) migration reduces (raises) total public debt by only 3.7 (3.8) percentage
points.
5.3.2 Growth and discount rate
The eﬀects of varying growth and discount rate assumptions on ﬁscal imbalance indicators are
displayed in Table 4. Changing the base case assumptions of long-term productivity growth of
1.5 percent to 1 and 2 percent, and the discount rate of 5 percent to 2, 4 and 6 percent, can lead
to an maximal increase (decrease) of inter-temporal public liabilities as a share of base year
GDP by 184.0 (58.8) percentage points. Thereby, additional per capita net taxes levied on
both current and future generations need to increase (decrease) by ATS 657200 (ATS 204100)
in order to balance the inter-temporal budget constraint. Per capita net tax payments on
members of future generations only are to increase (decrease) by ATS 1327600 (ATS 462400).
It can be seen that total public debt increases with an increase in the growth rate, since
negative base year net tax payments are magniﬁed. It also increases with a decrease in the
discount rate, since long-term cohort deﬁcits due to population aging are given high weight.
Accordingly, the additional tax burden on future as well as on current and future generations
increases with lower discount and higher growth rates. The sensitivity analysis reveals that
the generational account measures are robust at least qualitatively, even if the range of values
obtained can be quite large, depending on the actual growth and discount rate values chosen.
Even under the most optimistic scenario, assuming a growth rate of 1 percent and a discount
rate of 6 percent, true public debt exceeds oﬃcial public debt, expressed as a share of base
year GDP, respectively, by 47.3 percentage points. This indicates that the continuation of
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26Table 4: Sensitivity to growth and discount rate assumptions.
Discount rate
4 percent 5 percent 6 percent
Growth rate: 1 percent
IPL (% of GDP) 203.1 140.8 108.7
Generational accounta
base year new-born -1052.6 -1043.2 -1076.9
future new-bornb 1775.6 1280.0 1027.2
Lump-sum taxa,c 618.4 400.9 291.9
Growth rate: 1.5 percent
IPL (% of GDP) 260.1 167.5 123.1
Generational accounta
base year new-born -1112.5 -1037.1 -1058.1
future new-bornb 2188.5 1489.6 1131.2
Lump-sum taxa,c 822.8 496.0 343.9
Growth rate: 2 percent
IPL (% of GDP) 351.5 205.9 142.6
Generational accounta
base year new-born -1250.6 -1054.6 -1042.3
future new-bornb 2817.2 1780.9 1282.2
Lump-sum taxa,c 1153.2 632.5 413.3
a Thousands ATS (base year current values).
b In order to render ﬁscal policy sustainable inter-temporally.
c Annual additional average tax payment per capita of native population balancing the
inter-temporal budget constraint.
Note: Generational accounts for natives. Base year 1998. Base case fertility, mortality and
immigration.
276 Immigration policy and ﬁscal sustainability
Immigration is proposed frequently as a means to improve inter-temporal ﬁscal sustainabil-
ity55, because, on the one hand, immigrants typically augment the population share of individ-
uals of working age, who are net contributors to the public budget. This eﬀect is of particular
importance in the light of the ongoing demographic aging of native populations. As discussed
brieﬂy in Section 4.1, the status quo migration scenario assumes annual net immigration to
increase from 17300 in 2001 to around 29000 in 2006, and to decrease from then onwards
to 22500 in 2050. Due to a lack in age-speciﬁc population projections for immigrants, net
immigration is assumed to occur in such a way as to keep the population shares of foreigners
in the various age groups constant to the average value of the years 2000-2002 from 2001
onwards. Thus, the favourable age composition of foreigners in these years, with more than 10
percent of age 25 to 35 and less than 0.5 percent of age 75 to 100 is assumed to persist in the
future.56 On the other hand, immigrants alleviate the burden on natives also for a given value
of inter-temporal public debt, namely by increasing the number of agents who may share the
additional net tax payments required in order to redeem the debt. Consequently, immigration
might improve inter-temporal generational imbalance even if immigrant cohorts accumulate
generational deﬁcits.
6.1 The sustainability impacts of immigration policies
In the following, we will deal with the question of the extent to which future immigration
may alleviate the inter-temporal ﬁscal burden on the native population in Austria. For this
purpose, we compute the previously speciﬁed indicators of inter-temporal ﬁscal imbalance for
diﬀerent migration scenarios. As could be seen in Table 3, higher (lower) immigration than in
the base case scenario lowers (raises) the inter-temporal public ﬁnancing gap. This was to be
expected, given the assumption of the constant favourable age distribution of foreigners. Since
a representative immigrant to Austria is a net contributor to public ﬁnances under status quo
conditions, each additional immigrant improves the inter-temporal sustainability of base year
tax and transfer levels further.57 We can also simulate the eﬀect of immigration policies that
actively screen immigrants for characteristics that are expected to improve their labour market
performance and thus their potential for ﬁscal contribution. Following Bonin (2001), we assess
the eﬀect of immigration policies that select immigrants by skill and age on inter-temporal
ﬁscal imbalance. First, we assume that by screening immigrants by skill, immigration policy
eﬀectively raises foreign base year net tax payments to the levels observed for natives.58 In
55See for example Bonin (2001).
56A comparison of the foreign age composition in the year 1981 to the average of the years 2000-2002 shows
that the age pattern persisted by and large; the relative share of foreigners among the oldest old even decreased.
57Still, a considerable ﬁnancing gap remained even under the high immigration scenario, indicating that by
immigration alone it will not be possible to achieve long-term ﬁscal sustainability.
58We can regard this scenario as an upper bound of the impact of screening by skill (compare Bonin (2001),
p.186)).
28this case, as is shown in Table 5, inter-temporal ﬁscal liabilities decrease considerably, from
167.5 percent of base year GDP down to 151.68 percent.
Table 5: Screening of immigrants and inter-temporal ﬁscal imbalance.
base case screening
by skill by age
IPL (% of GDP) 167.5 151.7 166.6
Generational accounta
base year new-born -1037.1 -1037.1 -1037.1
future new-bornb 1489.6 1218.1 1476.3
Percentage change necessary
for future cohorts only:
all taxes and transfers 43.8 39.0 43.5
taxes only 71.2 63.0 70.8
transfers only 113.5 102.6 113.2
for all cohorts:
all taxes and transfers 8.2 7.3 8.2
taxes only 14.5 12.8 14.4
transfers only 18.9 16.9 18.8
Lump-sum taxa 496.0 444.7 493.8
a Thousands ATS (base year current values).
b In order to render ﬁscal policy sustainable inter-temporally.
Note: Generational accounts for natives. Base year 1998. Growth rate 1.5 percent, discount rate 5
percent.
This is the case even though foreigners now not only exhibit higher present value net tax pay-
ments during working age, but also higher present value net transfer receipts during retirement
age (see Figure 4). A representative foreigner now pays ATS 841610, which is more than twice
the average foreign contribution in the base scenario.59 As a result, the life-time net tax pay-
ments of future-born natives that are necessary to render public ﬁnances sustainable decrease
by ATS 271500. If applied to both currently living and future generations, the necessary lump-
sum tax on natives decreases by ATS 51330. Secondly, we assume that potential immigrants
are screened by age and that, as a consequence, the fraction of male immigrants aged between
16 and 30 and female immigrants aged between 31 and 45 (females) who exhibit the highest
cohort surpluses permanently increases by 20 percent while the absolute immigrant inﬂow
59Not shown in the Table.
29stays unchanged.60 In this case, inter-temporal ﬁscal imbalance is reduced slightly, with the
tax burden on future generations falling by only ATS 13300, while those on both current and
future generations falls by only ATS 2200. We can therefore conclude that for an immigration
policy that intends to beneﬁt public ﬁnances, screening by skill may be better suited than
screening by age, due to the already favourable age composition of foreigners in Austria.61
7 Related literature
The ﬁrst generational accounting analysis of Austrian public ﬁnances was done for the year
1995 by Keuschnigg et al. (1999, 2000) in the course of a round of studies based on a uniform
method, which was initiated by the European Commission in 1998.62 In comparison, the
present generational accounting survey with 1998 as its base year provides an opportunity
to assess the eﬀects that ﬁscal policy measures and macroeconomic changes since 1995 had
on Austrian generational accounts and the true public debt. However, it has to be said that
direct comparability is limited due to inevitable diﬀerences in the microeconomic data sources
used, and that one should therefore be cautious in the interpretation of results. Besides, the
major aim here was to undertake a study that had not yet been done for Austria: namely, to
compute generational accounts separately for natives and foreigners. This approach does not
only allow to assess intergenerational but also intragenerational redistribution between natives
and foreigners and also promises to contribute an answer to the often raised question about the
extent to which immigration can be a solution to impending ﬁscal and, in particular, pension
sustainability problems. Using generational accounting, Auerbach and Oreopoulos (1999) ﬁnd
that new immigrants reduce the ﬁscal burden borne by natives if the entire ﬁscal imbalance
is placed on future generations. When the ﬁscal burden is shared by both current and future
generations, whether there is a ﬁscal gain from immigration depends on the extent to which
government purchases rise with the immigrant population. The impact of immigration on ﬁscal
balance is found to be very small relative to the size of the overall imbalance itself. Smith
and Edmonston (1997) contains another detailed evaluation of the future ﬁscal impact of
immigrants in the US along the lines of the generational accounting method. It distinguishes
immigrants not only by age, but also by educational level, immigrant generation and time
since arrival, and estimate separate ﬁscal proﬁles for each of those immigrant categories. In
addition, it computes immigrants’ ﬁscal impact by level of government, i.e. the local, state and
federal level. It is found that immigrants contribute positively on the federal level, because
the positive eﬀect of their relatively (in comparison to natives) favourable age distribution
more than oﬀsets the negative eﬀect of their relatively lower education. The impact on the
state and local level, however, is found to be negative, because the beneﬁts (education, in
particular) are received earlier in life than those on the federal level (pensions, health care)
and are thus less heavily discounted. The total ﬁscal impact is positive for the average U.S.
60The immigrant share of all other age cohorts is reduced proportionately (compare Bonin (2001), p.187).
61Compare Bonin (2001) for a similar result.
62See Keuschnigg et al. (1999).
30resident. Finally, Bonin, Raﬀelh¨ uschen and Walliser (2000) used generational accounting to
assess the ﬁscal impact of immigrants in Germany. They ﬁnd the impact to be signiﬁcantly
positive if immigrants resemble current migrant residents in their economic characteristics. It
is nevertheless too small to remove inter-temporal ﬁscal imbalance.
8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we employed generational accounting to analyse the inter-temporal stance
of Austrian public ﬁnance in 1998 as well as the inter-temporal ﬁscal impact of immigration
to Austria. Immigrants aﬀect inter-temporal ﬁscal balance in essentially two ways. Firstly,
they have a demographic eﬀect in enlarging the population (and thus the tax base) and in
altering its age- (and gender-) composition. Secondly, they change the ﬁscal characteristics
of age cohorts due to a representative immigrant exhibiting higher or lower tax and transfer
payments than a representative native of the same age and gender. The overall ﬁscal eﬀect of
immigration was found positive, under the assumption that the age and ﬁscal characteristics of
future immigrants resemble those of the current immigrant population in Austria. This is due
to a favourable age composition and lower per capita net transfer receipts during retirement
age, which compensates for lower per capita net tax payments during working age. However,
immigration is not likely to achieve inter-temporal ﬁscal balance, even if immigration increases
or migrants are screened by skill or age.
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